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This paper is the overview chapter of an edited volume on “The Distributional Effects of 
Government Spending and Taxation.” The paper offers the author’s perspective on the 
government’s role as a redistributive agent. Taxation and public spending programs are 
analyzed using the experiences of the United States and other OECD countries. The stark 
differences among the respective welfare systems are examined from an economic policy lens 
assessing the success and failure of the tested social policy programs. The measurement and 
distribution of well-being for special segments of the population, i.e., the elderly and women, 
are considered.   1
A government’s role as it relates to taxation and public spending has never gone unquestioned. 
The controversy arises from conservatives advocating fiscal responsibility and limited 
government intervention in a market economy, and thus supporting the notion that taxes should 
be levied at the lowest possible level specifically designated for the financing of the few public 
goods that only government can provide. There are advocates, on the other hand, supporting an 
expanded role for government and arguing in favor of higher taxes to finance more public 
goods, and for a social protection system of redistributive schemes that, to some extent, will 
correct the stark inequities in our society. Public provisioning of goods and services and 
redistribution policy can be defined according to different criteria, some of which have real 
economic significance while others are matters of convention and convenience. In general, 
“public spending can be wise or foolish, appropriate or inappropriate, effective or ineffective 
but—the paradox first pointed out by Keynes—it cannot be more costly to the economy as a 
whole than doing nothing” (Nell, 1988 p. 228).  
The provisioning of public goods and services can be wide ranging. It can be classified 
into two broad categories: one involving collective consumption goods—goods and services 
affecting the entire population such as defense, the judicial system, police and fire protection, 
physical infrastructure, and so on, the other private consumption goods—those affecting 
individuals that can also be provided by the private sector, such as education and health care 
services, since they can meet the microeconomic criteria of excludability, positive supply curves 
and have no “external effects” found in the collective consumption goods (Samuelson 1966, pp. 
1223-5, emphasis in the original). Moreover, the latter category of goods admittedly possesses 
“an element of variability in the benefit that can go to one citizen at the expense of some other 
citizen,” but it is not necessarily synonymous to being optimally produced solely by the ordinary 
market process (Samuelson 1966, p. 1232, emphasis in the original). There can be a number of 
other arguments, however, supporting their place within the functions of government. These 
arguments can include: (i) market failure, (ii) basic needs considerations, (iii) externalities,  (iv) 
distributional considerations (Hare 1988, p. 68). 
Public finance projects, especially those involving education and health cannot be 
usually determined or ranked on the basis of their rate of return, but rather on their discounted 
net benefits (Summers 2003, p. 285). Education is subject to long-term decisions and the rates 
of return are assumed to be reflected in future earnings while health care is fraught with   2
incidence of adverse selection and moral hazard both resulting in inefficient markets or in 
absolute market failure. For both education and health are in the realm of public provisioning. 
The concept of basic needs enters into the argument for the public provisioning of goods 
that are required to maintain “socially accepted norms or standards.” Along the same line, 
minimum amounts of schooling and health to ensure social cohesion can be justified. Providing 
the elderly with a state pension may or may not be sufficient to cover their basic needs, the latter 
then requiring further public intervention (Hare, 1988 p. 69).      
Externalities are hard to quantify, but they are nevertheless prominently present if one 
assumes that returns to education result in the societal improvement and thus redounding in 
benefits to a larger segment of the population beyond the individuals whose human capital has 
increased most absolutely. The same can be said for health care publicly provided as not only 
positively affecting those who fall ill, but also being beneficial to the rest by reducing the risk of 
infection (Hare, 1988, pp. 69-70). 
Income distribution has always been a dominant concern of the public sector. 
Governments are empowered to impose taxes on commodities, income and wealth and spend 
the resulting revenues in many ways to achieve a more equitable distribution. Targeted re-
distributive transfers, that is, assistance to the poor and the disabled, social insurance and 
pensions, agricultural supports, can benefit either a large segment of the population or a narrow 
one. “Similarly in the absence of a complete system of private markets for [particular goods and 
services] some public sector provision is likely to be justified on distributional grounds” (Hare, 
1988, p. 70). The public supply of such goods and services is not tantamount to that provided 
only by state-run enterprises, but perhaps through partnership between the private and public 
sectors. The financing of such programs can come from various sources of general tax revenues 
or special tax-surcharges. 
In general, neither benefits from public goods and services, nor costs are equally 
distributed. The wealthier constituency pays the larger share of the tax burden while poorer 
persons pay the smaller. Thus, their respective interests in the size of these programs are 
necessarily contradictory for the former prefer smaller programs while the latter the more 
generous. These include various programs of the welfare state, unemployment and disability 
insurance, retirement benefits, and special purpose subsidies and transfers. Public spending 
represented as a fraction of gross domestic product differs greatly across countries (Schwabish, 
Smeeding and Osberg, chapter 9, this volume). André Sapir (2005) for example, distinguishes   3
four models of Western European welfare state systems: The Nordic model of the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands devotes the highest fraction of public expenditures on social 
protection and universal welfare provision. The model of the Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland 
and the United Kingdom) offers relatively large social assistance of last resort with cash 
transfers directed mainly to working age individuals. The Continental model of Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg relies primarily on strong employment protection 
and provides generous unemployment insurance and retirement benefits. Finally, the 
Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) focus their social expenditures on 
old-age retirement programs with differences in the degree of eligibility and benefit amounts. 
Employment protection is heavily regulated and support for early-retirement provisions result in 
reducing the number of job seekers. 
The latest figures for 2002 taken from the EU Commission Public Finance Report 
(2004) show public spending for the Nordic countries to average more than 53 percent, the 
Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan a little less than 40 percent, the Continental and 
Mediterranean countries close 50 percent, but all above the corresponding 35 percent of 
Australia, Switzerland, and the United States. Furthermore, each country’s composition of 
spending varies considerably. The fifteen member states of the European Union, before the last 
enlargement, devoted 3 to 16 percent of total public spending on the unemployed representing 
an income replacement rate of 20 to 90 percent. During the last three decades, a rapidly growing 
component of public spending in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere has been assigned to 
public pensions while public investment has been in the order of 3 percent of GDP. Transfers 
and subsidies had grown the most of all components of government primary spending in the 
postwar period especially in the years of 1960-1982; by 1990, they averaged one-half of the 
total public expenditures. Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995, 1996) tracking the historical 
development of subsidies and transfers, found that for the seventeen industrialized democracies 
that they studied,
1 subsidies and transfers were immaterial in those countries a century ago. In 
the postwar period in the OECD countries, the average transfer/subsidy share of GDP stood at 
about 9 percent around 1960, but grew to about 23 percent by around 1994. The overall growth 
of welfare state programs was unprecedented but varied widely among many countries, as noted 
earlier. In 1990, the GDP share in Japan was below 10 percent, whereas in the Netherlands it 
was close to 40 percent of GDP. In another part of the globe, some Latin American countries’   4
public spending on social protection has been very small and is devoted mainly to social 
insurance and directed albeit disproportionately to the upper middle class. 
Beginning with the latter part of the nineteenth century, redistribution became one of the 
most important functions of government, requiring some form of imposed transfer of income 
and wealth from the better-off to the less so. The first old-age pension system, for example, was 
instituted in Germany in the late 1880s. Ever since, public spending for redistributive purposes 
continued to a varying degree. Financing World War I meant the imposition of higher taxes that 
continued after the conflict and were used to fund higher public expenditures. It is during this 
time that many countries instituted social security systems, and in the United States, following 
the Great Depression, the New Deal gave a boost to expansionary government expenditures 
including a number of work-related and income-assisted programs.  Fast forward to the early 
1970s, the role and size of the public sector were questioned when the Keynesian advocated 
activist government faltered. Questions relating to public sector expenditure efficiency became a 
major topic in the policy discussion and economic research arenas. In the rapidly growing 
literature of academic research on this topic, performance and efficiency indicators were 
devised, institutions and rules were assessed, and the optimal levels of government were 
suggested (Persson and Tabellini, 2001, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, 
2003, Rodrik 2000, Afonso et al. 2005). Public sector performance and efficiency put aside, 
present day societies play a crucial role in the economy in seeking to improve well-being and 
alleviate poverty. 
Rising incomes have been associated with faster economic growth.
2 It was, until 
recently, assumed that poor and working families, even those with little or no education could 
ascend into the middle class, and those less fortunate who were unemployed, disabled, and the 
retired elderly would also be cared for by the modern welfare state. But, even though most of 
the OECD countries saw their economies grow in the 1980s and 1990s, public expenditures 
were cut in concert with legislative mandates for deficit reduction and “fiscal responsibility.” 
During the same period, a disturbing and marked increase in inequality was recorded, and in the 
United States especially, the robust economic growth notwithstanding, inequality has been 
distinctly higher. Yet, if economic growth does not improve the human condition, there is an 
expectation of a modern society’s redistributive policies that they have a positive impact on the 
level and distribution of household economic well-being together with an improvement in   5
inequality. Estimating, however, the impact of the distributional effects of government policies 
is itself a difficult task.  
Part I of the book deals with public sector redistributive effects in the United States and 
opens with Wolff and Zacharias (chapter 2) who note, the last study to measure the net effect of 
government expenditures and taxes on economic well-being was for the year 1970, more than 
three decades ago, in contrast to a significant number of theoretical papers published on the 
topic.
3 Traditionally, the Census Bureau has provided estimates of extended measures of 
disposable income reflecting the effects of taxes and transfer payments, but as Wolff and 
Zacharias argue these measures do not represent an accurate estimate of economic well-being 
which to them is defined as “the magnitude of the command or access of the household over the 
products produced.” The proper measures of well-being, aside from various transfers between 
the state and households that include direct and indirect taxation, need to account for 
expenditures such as schooling and physical infrastructure among other things, that is, public 
consumption in general attributable for the benefit of households and provided by the state. In 
addition, income must somehow include the employer contribution for various benefits and the 
imputed value from home and non-home wealth. In their analysis, Wolff and Zacharias proceed 
to construct two estimates of income they label pre-fiscal and post-fiscal income respectively. 
Pre-fiscal income is defined as the income that enables households to command products 
entailing market and quasi-market transactions, while the post-fiscal income is pre-fiscal income 
and net government expenditures. It is important to underscore the particular years of their 
estimates, 1989 and 2000, since these represent the terminal years of the last two exceptionally 
high growth periods for the United States. Furthermore, the period of the 1990s is distinct for a 
number of institutional and market changes were implemented affecting both the tax and 
expenditure policy including the “end of welfare as we know it.” 
The Wolff and Zacharias analysis shows that in 1989 and 2000, the effect of net 
government expenditures on the level and distribution of economic well-being was significant. 
Overall, their results indicate that net government expenditure was negative and that Americans 
were taxed more than they received in benefits from either transfers or public consumption. 
They also found that the difference between the mean and median values of pre-fiscal and post-
fiscal income was small, in the range of 4 percent, while the mean and median values of post-
fiscal income were about 20 to 30 percent higher than the money income—the most widely 
accepted measure. When their overall estimates, however, are examined by various categories of   6
income and household structure their results are much more revealing. Other estimates, 
painstakingly documented are based on (i) household characteristics, that is, race, age, family 
type and (ii) income deciles. Their conclusion, in contrast with the American notion of a small 
government since size is positively correlated with inefficiency and waste which has been 
shown to ring true for the better-off, can be summed-up as yet another endorsement in favor of 
activist government redistributive policies as an effective instrument in reducing income 
inequality.  
Old-age income security looms large on a government’s agenda whether it involves a 
state sponsored pension system or a framework within which incentives—tax preferred for 
retirement saving, can be promoted. Investigating the structure of privately funded retirement, 
Burman, Gale, Hall, and Orszag note in chapter 3 that there has always been government 
involvement in subsidizing retirement savings since the institution of income tax. Over the 
years, the United States government, irrespective of party affiliation, has offered incentives to 
promote retirement savings. These fall under the rubric of tax-preferred schemes based on a 
fraction of labor income. The incentives encouraging saving for retirement differ widely and 
their effectiveness is dependent on the level of earnings and accumulated wealth. Thus, the 
distributional effects of such programs are important, since they may involve either reduction of 
consumption for the low-income, low-wealth households or shifting of assets for the high-
income, high net-worth households. The analysis undertaken by Burman, Gale, Hall, and Orszag 
focuses on the distributional effects of defined contribution pension plans that are either 
employer-sponsored or individually arranged. The authors using the Tax Policy Center’s 
microsimulation model of the United States federal income tax system produce estimates of 
contributions and benefits. Defined contribution retirement plans were introduced relatively late 
in the 20
th century in substitution of the long-implemented defined benefit plans that emulated 
those sponsored by the state, but it turned out to be difficult to finance their actuarially 
determined liabilities given the volatility of corporate profits and the relative freedom of 
investment adventuring. (Defined contribution plans are based on investment income from 
contributions—employer/employee or individually arranged IRAs—as opposed to defined 
benefit plans based on length of service and earnings especially late career earnings.) The 
authors’ detailed simulations show that the tax benefits of new contributions to the defined 
contribution retirement plans are skewed, and are primarily favorable toward the highest income 
households, namely, more than 50 percent of the benefits accrue to the top 10 percent. In   7
contrast, the IRA plans are much less so, namely 60 percent of IRA tax benefits go to the top 20 
percent of households and 85 percent of benefits accrue to the top 40 percent. The most 
disturbing finding is that the bottom 20 percent receives no benefit from the income tax 
incentives because few workers contribute since the tax benefit per dollar contribution is very 
small or zero due to the marginal income tax rate being low or zero. Similarly, the simulations 
of employer contributions show even skewer distributional patterns with the highest benefits 
going to the 0.1 percent of employees. The picture drawn from the Burman, Gale, Hall, and 
Orszag study calls for a serious reconsideration in creating incentives for retirement savings, 
that is, offering tax refunds to those in the lowest marginal income tax rate who contribute, that 
are more in concert with the reality facing the low-income segment of the population.  
State sponsored retirement programs such as the United States’s Social Security system 
are by far the most important mechanisms for achieving redistributive outcomes. Projections of 
retiree benefits over the long run given the variety of household characteristics have spurned 
much debate in the policy-making arena. This is precisely the main concern of chapter 4 
authored by Butrica, Iams, and Smith. The authors analyze and contrast retiree incomes of 
various cohorts: current retirees (born in the 1926-35 period), near term retirees (born in 1936-
45), early baby-boomer retirees (born in 1946-55), and late baby-boomers (born in 1956-65). 
Using the Social Security Administration’s Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), and 
taking into account a number of demographic and socioeconomic changes that have and are 
projected to take place in the foreseeable future, the authors project retiree incomes, replacement 
income rates and poverty rates for various population groups. Whereas Social Security was 
originally conceived as an insurance program with the objective to provide replacement income 
from work at retirement, it has, over time, expanded to include benefits for spouses, children, 
and the disabled. Retirement benefits are not solely determined on the basis of earnings from 
employment, but reflect marriage history and status at retirement, and spouse’s earning history 
as well. The projections documented in chapter 4, include the changing trends of the typical 
family that now includes two wage earners or is headed by a single female working parent. The 
family structure also involves divorces and multiple marriages, and rising life expectancy rates. 
When these trends are taken into account, the projections yield benefits changes for recent 
retirees and for those at future retirement. The MINT projections estimate (i) future per capita 
income that includes in addition to Social Security benefits, private pension income, income 
from various assets, imputed rental income, secondary earnings, and income from non-spouse   8
family members living at home, (ii) poverty rates and (iii) income replacement rates. 
Methodological disagreements aside, the message of this analysis is that in general, baby 
boomers will most likely have higher incomes and lower poverty rates than those of the current 
retirees, and their replacement income rates will be lower than those suggested by financial 
planning advocates. The projections for several sub-groups of baby boomers however, show 
economic vulnerability for the old aged divorced women, never married men, Hispanics, high 
school dropouts, those with marginal attachment to the labor force, and those with the lowest 
lifetime wages. Moreover, it is very probable that a good number of them could be in poverty at 
retirement.  
In evaluating the effectiveness of several key social programs, international comparisons 
become vital when assessing redistributive policies. Yet, such comparisons are particularly 
difficult given limitations and incompatibility of data. Parts II and III of the book, comprising 
chapters 5-10, attempt to address this important task. In chapter 5, a team of seven authors, 
Immervoll, Levy, Lietz, Mantovani, O’Donoghue, Sutherland, and Vesbist, offer a comparison 
among the redistributive aspects of taxation and social benefits in the 15 “old” member 
countries of the European Union using a microsimulation method of the European model, 
EUROMOD. Their cross-national analysis illustrates the effects of tax and social benefits 
programs on the level of household disposable income as well as the corresponding income 
inequalities before and after taxation and benefits are applied. The authors are able to overcome 
the various problems with cross-national data limitations and incompatibilities by partly 
harmonizing micro-data with the use of well-established simulation techniques. Their 
methodology does not use data to directly extract the tax and benefits, but instead, uses it as a 
basis to calculate tax liabilities and benefits entitlements in accordance with accepted rules that 
would result in observations being very close to those as if they were officially determined. 
Their results are framed in a way that particular comparisons can be drawn: the profile for the 
average household and that of either the top and the bottom quintiles is contrasted; the 
redistributive effects of four specific tax-benefit programs—means-tested benefits, non means-
tested benefits, social contributions and income taxes—are determined; and the Gini coefficients 
are estimated to document changes in income inequalities resulting from the redistributive 
effects of tax-benefit systems. Their findings are striking in that there is extensive variation 
among the EU-15 countries. Pensions, for example, play a major role in reducing inequality in 
Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, France, and Spain and a minor one in Ireland, the United   9
Kingdom, and a lesser one in Denmark. Other findings show that non means-tested benefits are 
very important in the redistributive process in all 15 countries while the inequality reduction 
resulting from means-tested benefits varies significantly. Finally, the effect of income taxes on 
reducing inequality is high in the countries with the most equal distributions of disposable 
income such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands, and also in Ireland and Spain. In summary, the Immervoll, et al., analysis reaffirms 
the welfare state categorization of  Andrè Sapir referred to earlier. 
The next three chapters are country specific sequential analyses of the tax-benefit 
distributional effects for Poland, Australia, and Korea. Leon Podkaminer explores Poland’s 
redistribution experiences for the pre- and post-socialist periods. The economic system of pre-
socialist Poland, he writes, was egalitarian ensuring fairness in the distribution of income and 
consumption. Consequently, inequality in personal income and wealth was fairly low and was 
complemented by a public pension system. The “shock therapy” of 1990 brought with it 
declining fortunes exemplified by a precipitous drop in real wages, farmer’s incomes, and 
retirement benefits. These trends were halted for some years post-1991, that improved matters 
very much, only to return in the latter part of the 1990s instituting a new structure of public 
finance marked with low taxes—a de facto flat tax for all—and spending cuts including 
decreases in social transfers. The conclusion of this chapter suggests that based on the Polish 
experience, the controversial proposition that high levels of redistribution can be good for 
growth and less inequality should not be dismissed but be seriously reconsidered.                
Australia’s experience regarding its redistribution efforts is quite similar to other OECD 
countries as evidenced in the analysis presented in chapter 7. The country’s tax-benefit program 
is not exemplary, but better than those found in most countries of the industrialized world. The 
winner/loser pairs vary depending on the taxes collected—some are progressive while others are 
regressive—and the benefit distributed. The winners, overall, are elderly Australians and sole 
parents while couples with no children and single person households are net losers. Using data 
obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Household Expenditure Surveys in 1998-
99 and running simulations for 2001-02, Ann Harding, Rachel Lloyd, and Neil Warren cover a 
lot of ground in this chapter. They quite successfully estimate the social security cash transfers 
and family payments, income taxes, tax rebates, and allowances such as the health insurance 
rebate, the Commonwealth Goods and Services Tax, all excise taxes, and imputed values (non-
cash) of health, welfare, and education benefits. Their approach of estimating an expanded   10
measure of household income is reminiscent of similar type measures of economic well-being—
albeit with clearly distinct differences—employed by Wolff and Zacharias and Immervoll, et al., 
previously seen in chapters 2 and 5 respectively. Clearly, government intervention through 
collection of taxes and distribution of benefits lessens the gap between the poor and the better 
off. Moreover, the Harding, Lloyd, and Warren study demonstrates that Australia’s system of 
taxes and benefits is designed to assist households over their lifecycle, by redistributing income 
and benefits from times of relative plenty to times of relative indigence such as when there are 
children and during retirement. 
The empirical exploration of equity consequences of Korea’s income tax system is the 
focus of chapter 8. Kwang Soo Cheong’s analysis uses newer and novel methods of analyzing 
panel data in estimating the redistributive effects of the country’s income tax system and the 
consequent changes in vertical equity and horizontal equity and tax-induced income re-ranking. 
Estimates of vertical equity demonstrate the degree of the tax progression while horizontal 
inequity is the result of tax-induced household income re-ranking. The author’s findings reveal 
some undesirable redistributive effects of Korea’s tax system affecting horizontal inequity, 
exemplified by the tax-induced household income re-ranking, in addition to re-affirming other 
studies’ findings of the moderate degree of tax progressivity. 
The relationship between inequality and social spending form the theme of chapter 9, 
which begins Part III of the book. In it, Jonathan Schwabish, Timothy Smeeding, and Lars 
Osberg consider a number of important, interesting, and intertwined issues relating to the 
questions they attempt to address. The focus is surveying non-elderly social expenditures and 
subsequently testing their relationship to inequality in a model the authors construct, 
incorporating variables such as values (which they equate with trust), growth, institutions, and 
immigrants using a dataset with 57 different sets of observations for 17 countries drawn from 
data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study, the OECD, and the World Value Survey. The 
reported results confirm Robert Reich’s hypothesis who, referring to America’s rich, noted that 
they “feel increasingly justified in paying only what is necessary to insure that everyone in their 
community is sufficiently well educated and has access to the public services they need to 
succeed” (1991). Alas, the Schwabish, Smeeding, and Osberg study shows that America’s 
“fortunate top fifth” is not much different than those in other countries, too. 
The final chapter (10) returns to the topic of pensions, and attempts to estimate various 
aspects of generosity. Mathieu Lefèbvre and Pierre Pestieau perform a series of econometric   11
tests to determine the correlation, evolution, and economic openness relations among three 
kinds of pension generosity based on: average benefits, early retirement, and poverty alleviation. 
The authors’ results, considered perhaps controversial, indicate that the three types of generosity 
are not correlated, that the evolution into contributory plans has made them more generous and 
benefiting the poor, and that economic integration (openness) is linked, not significantly, with 
redistribution. 
The chapters in this book present theories, findings, and applied policies dealing with 
one or more issues of income distribution and well-being. While many a reader may not agree 
with all of them, I hope the many lessons drawn from the success and failure of the tested social 
policies will help continue the search and development of better policies to improve economic 
inequality.   12
NOTES 
1.The countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
2. In the words of United States President John F. Kennedy, as he put it, “A rising tide lifts all 
boats.” 
3. See, Bowles and Gintis (1982), Shaikh and Tonak (1987,1994).     13
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